Monthly Archives: December 2013

Regional Security Assessment, Dec 18, 2013

19 Thursday Dec 2013

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I thought that a bi-monthly security assessment by an expert will be a good addition to this blog. So, I intend to have a bi-monthly security assessment, and The Reneric Group has given me the permission to post the following Regional Security assessment. Please, I am looking forward to your feedback and comments. – Sany

By  Byron Brown, MSA
CEO/President The Reneric Group
Email: byron@trgoperations.com

December 18, 2013

The following report is the current security issues occurring in Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. All organizations and businesses operating in these areas should pay particular attention to the safety and security they are providing their customers and employees.

Central Africa Republic (CAR) – Extreme conditions The ongoing violence and displaced persons crises worsens throughout the CAR, more than 240,000 displaced persons are being affected by the violence. Christian militias massacred 27 Muslims in a village in the west of the Central African Republic (CAR) on Thursday, UN officials said Friday. The French government has deployed more soldiers to the country and continues to support the efforts to stabilize the worsening security situation in CAR.

The United Nations Children’s Fund is reporting more than 2.3 million children are being affected by the violence in CAR, as many as 6,000 are believed to have been recruited as child soldiers and being killed for being Muslim or Christians.

Chad – Continued Travel Alert:  U.S. citizens are warned of the risks of travel to Chad and recommends citizens avoid all travel to eastern Chad and border regions. Because of security concerns, the U.S. Embassy in Chad reviews all proposed travel by official U.S. government personnel to areas outside the capital, N’Djamena, and its immediate surroundings before approving such arrangements.

U.S. citizens affiliated with humanitarian relief efforts similarly should review security precautions and consider measures to mitigate exposure to violent crime and other threats. U.S. citizens residing in Chad should exercise caution throughout the country.

The frequency of violent crime in rural Chad is highly variable. Incidents of robbery, carjacking at gunpoint, and murder have been reported throughout the country. While there have been no kidnapping for ransom incidents in Chad since 2010, regional trends suggest this still could be a potential threat in the future. Violence is occasionally associated with car accidents and other events causing injury to Chadian nationals.

Robbery victims have been beaten and killed, surgeons conducting unsuccessful medical interventions have been threatened with bodily harm, and law enforcement/military officials have been implicated in violent crime. In addition, although the last active rebel group was recently disarmed, armed groups might reemerge with little warning. The Government of Chad has few resources to guarantee the safety of visitors in rural Chad.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – The United Nations mission in the DRC sent soldiers conducting foot patrols and attack helicopters to North Kivu following the discovery of 21 brutally slaughtered civilians, including babies, children and women, some mutilated and raped. The bodies were discovered on Friday and Saturday in Musuku village in the Rwenzori area of Beni sector. The killers are yet to be identified, but villagers questioned believe they could be the work of the Allied Democratic Forces or the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda.

Continued travel alert: U.S. citizens should be aware of the risks of traveling to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa) (DRC). Security officials strongly recommend you avoid all travel to the city of Goma and the province of North Kivu, and all but essential travel to the province of South Kivu and the Ituri region in the province of Oriental. Because of ongoing instability and violence, the Department of State ability to provide consular services to U.S. citizens in these regions of the DRC is extremely limited.

Armed groups, bandits, and elements of the Congolese military remain security concerns in eastern and northeastern DRC. These armed groups, primarily located in the North Kivu, South Kivu, and Orientale provinces, as well as the northern part of Katanga province, and the eastern part of Maniema province, are known to pillage, steal vehicles, kidnap, rape, kill, and carry out military or paramilitary operations in which civilians are indiscriminately targeted. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is present near the border with Uganda, Central African Republic, and the Republic of South Sudan.

The UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) continues to assist the Congolese government with the protection of civilians and efforts to combat armed groups.

Travelers are frequently detained and questioned by poorly disciplined security forces at numerous official and unofficial roadblocks and border crossings throughout the country. Requests for bribes in such instances are extremely common, and security forces have occasionally injured or killed people who refused to pay. In the past year, several U.S. citizens were illegally detained by government forces, or were robbed of their valuables while being searched. Very poor infrastructure (road and air) makes the provision of consular services difficult outside of Kinshasa.

Kinshasa has a critical crime threat level, and U.S. citizens continue to be the victims of serious crimes, including armed robbery by groups posing as law enforcement officials in both urban and rural areas, especially after nightfall. Avoid walking alone and displaying cash and other personal property of value. Avoid taking photos in public, especially of government buildings and the airport (which are viewed as places of national security), police stations, the presidential palace, border crossings, and along the river, since doing so may lead to arrest

Ghana – Continued alert: West Africa is a major hub for drugs smuggled from Latin America and Asia to Europe and the US. The local criminal organizations operating within Ghana have unlimited funds from drug sales/trafficking and have the ability to purchase weapons and intimidate the communities at will. All organizations operating in Ghana should have security; policies and procedures in place to make sure their personnel are operating and living in a safe and secure environment.
Gulf of Guinea – Local officials are concerned as efforts begin to deliver results in combating piracy near Somalia, the Gulf of Guinea is beginning to experience an increase in piracy. All organizations operating in this area should be on heightened alert for pirate activity.

Kenya – Nairobi: There is police search for the man believed to be responsible for a grenade attack which killed six people in a mini-bus taxi in Pangani in Nairobi.  The country director, Justus Nyang’aya for Amnesty International was shot three times during a robbery while he was in his home, Mr. Nyang’aya is reported to be in stable condition following the attack.

Continued Alert: The continued alert is still in effect for the most populated cities of Nairobi and possibly outlying areas of the country. The warning includes Al-Shabaab (“the youth”), which have reportedly threatened to continue attacking countries participating in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Peace Support Operations (PSO). Kenya, Uganda and Burundi all send Peace Support Troop contingencies to assist with PSO operations under the AMISOM mandate. The mandate supports stabilizing the current situations in Somalia in order to create a non-hostile, peaceful country.

Niger – Niamey — there is still a credible threat for violence comparable to those of Mali, from jihadist militants still operating in Sahel’s remote wilderness. The rebel leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a prominent and long-time Sahel jihadist along with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which had operated in northern Mali before being dislodged by the French military, is still operating in the wilderness areas of the country and can cause serious trouble.

Continued alert:
The Maghreb terror group vowed “further operations” in Niger, which shares borders with several countries, including Algeria, Libya and Mali. The instability in Libya provided an opening for Islamist militants driven out of Mali, Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou has warned.

Terrorist groups have called for and executed attacks against countries that have supported intervention against terrorist groups in northern Mali, including Niger. The areas bordering Mali and Libya, and the northern region of Niger continue to be of specific concern.

Nigeria – The Nigerian Federal government announced and displayed their unmanned aircraft (drone), designed and built by the Nigerian Air Force. The drone is already in use flying missions over Nigeria.

Continued warning:  Abubakar Shekau, The leader of the Islamist militant group called for increased attacks on schools teaching Western style classes. All but essential travel to the following states due to the risk of kidnappings, robberies, and other armed attacks: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, and Zamfara. Also, travel to the Gulf of Guinea should only be considered for extreme emergencies, because of the threat of piracy.

Sudan / South Sudan – Heavy fighting occurred in Juba involving presidential guards, some sources indicate a possible coup was taking place, resulting in heavy gunfire. The city was placed on curfew after the clash begun and is still in effect until the officials can restore law and order in the city. Kenya airways have suspended all flights to Juba until the security situation is under control.
Anyone traveling in either country should be extra careful and have a security escorts due to numerous reports of ethnic violence and the constant threat of kidnapping of foreign workers (EXPATS), NGO’s and tourist.

Somalia – Mogadishu — The recent failed attempt by the U.S. Special Forces to extract high level rebels from Somalia show they still have the support of many people, necessary fire power and intelligence to thwart a specialized assault by the elite U.S. Special Forces. Al-Shabab is reported to have been removed from the capital area, but have taken root in several other East African countries, vowing to fight all enemies of their movement and any country participating in the Peace Support Operations in Somalia. The attack on the West Gate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya prove they have the will, resources, and ability to plan a coordinated attack in broad day light and hold off law enforcement agencies for days if not longer. They also have the ability to recruit assistance from countries outside of Africa to fight with their cause.

Continued alert: The security situation inside Somalia remains unstable and dangerous. Terrorist operatives and armed groups in Somalia have demonstrated their intent to attack the Somali authorities, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and other non-military targets. Kidnapping, bombings, murder, illegal roadblocks, banditry, and other violent incidents and threats to U.S. citizens and other foreigners can occur in any region.

Al-Shabab has vowed to keep attacking the westerners in the style they used at the West Gate Mall in Kenya and their supporters until they leave Mogadishu and Somalia.
Uganda – there are unverified reports of possible terrorist attacks against public meeting areas, shopping malls, restaurants and schools in the city of Kampala or other major tourist areas. The unverified reports indicate Al-Shabab may be planning on carrying out an attack like they did recently in Nairobi earlier this summer. They have proven they have the personnel, funding and will to carry out the attacks.

I invite you to contact me for ways we can assist you with protecting your personnel and assets abroad. We now offer our International Security Course, which will prepare your personnel for their travel and work abroad. We also offer specialized training for law enforcement organizations and military assigned with protecting the civilian population.

Contact information:
byron@trgoperations.com or complete our contact us form at http://www.trgoperations.com/contactus.html

Byron Brown, MSA
CEO/President
Email: byron@trgoperations.com

Du Mali à la RCA : Est-ce le retour du gendarme colonial?

09 Monday Dec 2013

Posted by in African conflicts

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La décision prise par la France d’envoyer 800 hommes pour aider à restaurer l’État déliquescent de la République Centrafricaine (RCA) et arrêter un conflit qui menace d’embraser les pays voisins comme le Cameroun, est louable. Cette décision vient consolider la nouvelle tendance de la politique sécuritaire française en Afrique.  Cette nouvelle orientation  a commencée à se dessiner avec la Côte-d’ Ivoire, où la France dirigée par M. Sarkozy (Président issu de la droite) a été chef de fil du déploiement de l’ONU dans la chute du Président Laurent Gbagbo et l’installation à la présidence, d’Alasane Dramane Ouattara, le présumé vainqueur d’une élection présidentielle très controversée. Elle s’est poursuivie par la campagne militaire contre Mouammar Kadhafi en Libye.  Si pour les africains ces deux démonstrations de force ont suscité la controverse, les dernières interventions décidées par le Président Hollande (Parti socialiste) en faveur du Mali et maintenant la décision de stopper les atrocités et contribuer à la stabilité en RCA reçoivent un accueil plutôt très favorable.

Réputée pour l’utilisation de la force pour assoir les régimes autoritaires dans les pays francophones d’Afrique, la France aujourd’hui, donne l’impression d’user de la même force pour rétablir la stabilité et l’état de droit.  Il est à noter que, si la France adopte cette nouvelle stratégie d’intervention, cela ne signifie pas qu’elle a modéré ou changé sa perception de l’Afrique.  Plusieurs personnes dans la sphère politique et celle des affaires en France considèrent encore l’Afrique francophone comme son « pré carré ».  L’histoire des relations entre la France et l’Afrique francophone nous apprend que ces interventions ne sont pas altruistes ou gratuites pour les Africains. Par le passé, ces interventions ont renforcé les intérêts de la France dans la région, il n’y a pas de raisons qu’il en soit autrement aujourd’hui.  Cette réalité est de plus en plus confirmée par la récente vague de rapports financés par le gouvernement français, qui démontrent en filigrane de l’apport  important de l’Afrique dans la prospérité présente et future de la France. Réalité clairement renforcée par le titre du dernier rapport du Sénat français sur les relations entre l’Afrique et la France : «L’Afrique est notre avenir ». 

Aucun pays d’Afrique n’illustre mieux que la République Centrafricaine cette nouvelle donne des interventions de la France.  En effet, le 20 septembre1979, la France lançait l’opération Caban pour renverser l’Empereur Bokassa et porter au pouvoir le Président David Dacko (qui lui-même fut renversé par un coup dirigé par Bokassa en 1966). L’opération Caban a été suivie par « l’opération Barracuda » pour sécuriser le Président Dacko nouvellement porté au pouvoir.

Ce fut à cette époque, un moment particulier dans l’histoire de la région et de celle de la RCA. Un moment au cours duquel certains politiciens français se prévalaient de ce que rien ne pouvait se passer dans leur « arrière-cour africaine » à leur insu ou sans leur influence. Les politiciens africains étaient également convaincus de la toute-puissance de cette « ancienne » puissance coloniale.   Cette conviction a longtemps entretenu ce qui de triste mémoire, a été connu sous le nom de « diplomatie des mallettes »; dans le cadre de laquelle les dirigeants africains se serviront de « porteurs de mallettes» pour livrer des valises pleines d’argent et de diamants à une certaine élite politique française.   Depuis lors, beaucoup de choses ont changé : la fin de la Guerre froide, l’émergence de nouveaux pays puissants faisant concurrence à la France dans la région, les changements politiques internes tant en France qu’en Afrique, etc. L’interventionnisme de la France va aussi évoluer et s’adapter  à cette ère nouvelle.  

 La décision d’envoyer en République Centrafricaine des soldats dans le cadre de l’opération Sangaris en plus des 400 qui y sont actuellement vise officiellement à aider la Mission africaine à arrêter le cycle de violence, de faciliter le retour des organisations humanitaires et de désarmer les milices armées.   Du fait de cette intervention qui vient à la suite de celle effectuée au Mali, la France dessine progressivement un modèle d’intervention dans les conflits en Afrique. Cette nouvelle stratégie comporte 4 principales étapes :

  1. Un effort diplomatique concerté pour obtenir l’accord de la communauté internationale, du Conseil de sécurité des Nations-Unies et des pays de la ligne de front du conflit concerné, avec pour objectif d’obtenir la légitimité et la force de la règle de droit. 
  2. Un déploiement d’une force militaire agissant comme force de transition pour arrêter la violence, protéger les civils et créer un espace sécurisé pour les interventions humanitaires.
  3. Une collaboration entre la force militaire française et les forces régionales (en général appuyées par l’UA) pour préparer la transition et le déploiement des forces de maintien de la paix de l’UA / des Nations Unies.
  4. Une présence militaire de dissuasion en fonction du théâtre des opérations, afin de dissuader les groupes hostiles, combattre les groupes terroristes et/ou former l’armée nationale.

Cette stratégie globale a été mise en exécution au Mali et maintenant, elle se déploie en République Centrafricaine.  Aussi cohérente que puisse paraître cette stratégie, elle ne manque cependant pas de failles. Tel que les événements se sont déroulés au Mali, si les efforts diplomatiques concertés ont apporté une certaine forme de légitimité et que l’intervention militaire a empêché des groupes islamistes de s’accaparer de Bamako, la collaboration avec les forces de l’ONU et la présence permanente des forces françaises de dissuasion suscitent des questions de fond et commencent à produire des conséquences néfastes, notamment la résurgence de sentiments nationalistes et anti-français ainsi que des alliances locales avec des groupes terroristes.  En d’autres termes, les avantages obtenus au Mali à travers les étapes 1 et 2 de l’intervention française sont menacés par les défis posés par les étapes 3 et 4.

En République centrafricaine, alors qu’il est encore trop tôt pour discuter des étapes 3 et 4 de la stratégie de l’intervention française, nous pouvons déjà estimer le prix à payer aux étapes 1 et 2.  Pendant que la communauté internationale essaie de trouver un consensus sur une façon d’intervention, des milliers de personnes sont victimes de massacre et le pays sombre dans le chaos.  Aujourd’hui, l’intervention arrive peut-être trop tard pour les centaines de milliers de victimes de cette guerre, en particulier pour le défunt procureur de la République Modeste Martineau, assassiné le 16 Novembre 2013.  

Que dire du déploiement militaire en RCA? Le jour suivant l’annonce faite de la France du déploiement de ses troupes en RCA, certains éléments des ex-Séléka qui terrorisaient les populations ont commencé à quitter Bangui avec leurs armes et équipements pour une destination inconnue ; on espère que les forces pro-Bozizé (président déchu) et anti-Balakas feront de même.  Si ce départ peut être interprété comme un bon signe pour les populations locales qui ne vivront pas des jours supplémentaires de terreur, il est cependant mauvais signe pour la stabilité de la région. Avec sa forêt dense et les frontières poreuses, la région offre de nombreuses cachettes pour ces groupes de dangereux bandits.  Ils iront probablement d’un coin à l’autre des forêts, des villes et villages voisins, sèmeront des troubles et vendront leurs compétences au plus offrant, comme ce fut le cas lors des conflits en Sierra Leone, au Liberia et en Côte- d’Ivoire. Le soulagement à court terme que pourrait apporter l’intervention française peut être précurseur de la future instabilité régionale à long ou à moyen terme. Le Cameroun ressent déjà les effets néfastes de ce conflit.  Il y a de fortes chances qu’avec la «fuite» de quelques hommes armés de l’ex-Séléka de Bangui, on assiste à une recrudescence des activités criminelles dans les villes et cités frontalières de la région.

Bien entendu, aucune stratégie n’est parfaite, surtout en tenant compte de la complexité des situations de conflit.  Même s’il peut-être trop tôt de tirer des conclusions, les cas du Mali et de la RCA révèlent d’importantes leçons susceptibles d’aider à capitaliser sur cette nouvelle stratégie d’intervention française. 

Une franche collaboration avec les acteurs locaux. Cette stratégie aura un impact positif durable, s’il existe une franche collaboration entre les forces françaises, les forces régionales et les autorités politiques légitimes issues d’une sorte de processus de consultation, par exemple les élections.  Une collaboration basée sur le respect et l’apprentissage mutuels, l’acceptation de la valeur ajoutée de chaque partenaire.   L’exemple de la gestion de la récente crise des otages au Mali, au cours de laquelle les autorités locales ont été tenues à l’écart de l’opération, n’est pas la voie à suivre.  Il y a un risque que les forces françaises prennent pour acquises la loyauté et la gratitude des autorités et des populations locales.  Ce serait une erreur.  La France doit se rappeler que sa simple présence rappelle aux autorités locales et aux pays de la région leur propre échec; donc inutile d’ajouter le mépris à l’injure.

Penser régional et agir local. Ceci ressemble à un vieux cliché, mais il ne peut être plus significatif dans ce cas.La plupart des défis que ces interventions sont censées résoudre exigent une approche régionale qui va au-delà du théâtre des opérations initiales.  Ces conflits font partie de systèmes de conflits qui engloutissent non seulement le foyer de la crise, mais aussi les pays de la ligne de front.   Par conséquent, toute intervention doit prendre en considération des facteurs tels que les alliances politiques régionales, les dynamiques ethniques transnationales, la religion et les questions transfrontalières. 

Les africains doivent renforcer la coopération militaire et diplomatique régionale. Aussi malheureux que puissent être ces crises, les interventions françaises offrent aux armées africaines la possibilité de travailler ensemble, d’harmoniser leurs manœuvres, d’élaborer des stratégies communes et mener des opérations conjointes pour faire face aux crises de plus en plus complexes et transnationales qui touchent plusieurs pays de la région.  C’est en travaillant d’abord ensemble que les pays africains pourraient tirer le meilleur parti de ces interventions françaises, et en fait, améliorer leur impact positif tout en atténuant leur  dommages collatéraux. Par conséquent, les pays africains ne peuvent pas agir de façon individuelle, ils doivent faire plus.  Ils devront apprendre à travailler ensemble dans les fronts militaires et diplomatiques, et en même temps s’appuyer sur ces interventions pour renforcer leurs propres capacités, telles que la Force africaine en attente (FAA) et la Capacité de déploiement rapide (CDR) tant annoncées par l’Union Africaine mais jamais mises en place, les forces sous-régionales de la CEDEAO, CEMAC, etc.

Cette nouvelle stratégie d’intervention de la France ne marque pas nécessairement le retour du gendarme colonial, c’est un défi lancé aux pays Africains et à l’Union Africaine. Les pays africains sauront-ils y répondre ?  Pourront-ils orienter la direction de cette nouvelle stratégie française dans le sens de la coopération, la paix et la stabilité en Afrique comme le prétend la France ou vers une dérive néocolonialiste comme le soupçonnent les sceptiques ? La réponse à cette question définira très certainement la réalité des relations franco-africaines à venir.

From Mali to Central African Republic: Is the Colonial Cop Back?

09 Monday Dec 2013

Posted by in African conflicts

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The recent decision by France to send over 800 soldiers to help stabilize the failed state of Central African Republic (CAR) and stop a transnational conflict is a laudable one. This decision reinforces a growing pattern in France foreign policy in Africa. In Cote d’Ivoire, France’s right-wing President Nicholas Sarkozy spearheaded the UN efforts to oust Laurent Gbagbo and instate Alasane Dramane Ouattara, the alleged winner of the presidential elections. Then followed the military campaign against Muammar Khadafi in Libya. But while these two campaigns were controversial among Africans, the recent interventions led by Socialist President Francois Hollande to save Mali and now to restore hope and stability in CAR were greeted with praise. Previously infamous for using force to defend authoritarian regimes in French-speaking African countries, today’s France seems to be using force to restore stability and the rule of law.

No other African country better captures the changing paradigm of French interventions than Central African Republic. On September 20th, 1979 the French launched operation Caban to support the coup d’état against Emperor Bokassa and to put in place President David Dacko (who himself had been deposed in a coup led by Bokassa in 1966). The operation Caban was then followed by “operation Barracuda” to secure the newly instated president Dacko.

That was a peculiar time in the history of CAR and the region, when French politicians prided themselves that nothing could happen in their “African backyard” without their knowledge or influence. African politicians were likewise convinced of the omnipotence of this “former” colonial power. This conviction fueled the notoriously named “suitcase diplomacy”– African leaders using “carriers” to deliver suitcases full of cash or diamonds to some French political elite. Many things have changed since then — the end of Cold War, the emergence of powerful state actors competing with France in the region, internal political dynamics in both France and Africa, etc. — and France’s policy in the region is adapting to this new reality.

The decision to send 800 French soldiers to CAR to complement the 400 already present aims primarily at supporting the African mission to stop the cycle of violence, facilitate the return of humanitarian organizations, and create a secure environment until the full deployment of the UN mission to CAR. With this intervention following the one in Mali, France is gradually sketching a template of intervention in African conflicts. This nascent strategy follows four major steps:

  1. A concerted diplomatic effort to rally the international community, the UN Security Council and countries on the frontline of a given conflict, with the goal of building legitimacy and legality.
  2. Deployment of a military force acting as a transitional force to stop violence, protect civilians and create a secure space for humanitarian interventions.
  3. Collaboration with regional forces, generally supported by the African Union (AU), to prepare the transition to and deployment of the joint AU/UN peacekeeping force.
  4. Continued presence of a residual force, depending on the theater of operations, to deter hostile groups, fights terrorist activities and/or train the national army.

We have seen this holistic strategy played out in Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and now CAR. As coherent as the strategy may appear, it is however not without its flaws. As seen in Mali, although the concerted diplomatic efforts yielded some form of legitimacy and the military intervention prevented Islamist groups to seize Bamako, the collaboration with the AU/UN forces and the continued presence of a residual French force are raising hard questions and generating adverse consequences: notably the resurgence of nationalistic and anti-French sentiments and local alliances with terrorists groups. In other words, the gains generated in Mali by steps 1 and 2 of the French intervention strategy are threatened by the challenges posed by steps 3 and 4.

In CAR, while it is still too early to discuss steps 3 and 4 of the French intervention strategy, we can already estimate the price tag of steps 1 and 2. While the international community negotiated ways to intervene, thousands of people were slaughtered and the country descended into chaos. Today, intervention may already be too late for the hundreds of thousands of victims of the conflict, such as state prosecutor Modeste Martineau, who was killed on November 16, 2013.

What about military deployment in CAR? The day after France announced its troop deployment, the former Seleka forces responsible for terrorizing the population began pulling out of Bangui for an unknown destination; the hope is that even the pro-Bozizé (deposed president) groups, the anti-balakas will follow that example. If this retreat can be seen as a good sign for the local population who will not have to endure more terror, it is a bad sign for the stability of the region. The dense forest and uncontrolled borders of the region offer plenty of hideouts for these dangerous thugs. These armed groups will most likely roam forests and nearby towns and villages, wreaking havoc and selling their skills to the highest bidder, as was the case during conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire. The short-term relief that will be brought by the French intervention may be a precursor of the middle- or longer-term instability to come. There are chances of seeing in months to come, intensification of criminal activities in border town and cities of the region.

Of course, no strategy is flawless, particularly given the complexity of armed conflicts. While it may be too early to draw conclusions, the situations in Mali and CAR are yielding valuable lessons that could help improve this nascent French intervention strategy on the continent.

Genuine collaboration with local stakeholders. If there is a genuine collaboration between French forces, regional forces, and the legitimate political authorities emerging from some sort of consultation or election process, this strategy will go a long way. This collaboration must be based on mutual respect and learning, recognizing the added value of each partner.  The example of the recent hostage crisis management in Mali, during which local authorities were kept out of the loop, is not the way to go. There is indeed the temptation for the French forces to take for granted the loyalty and gratitude of local authorities and populations. It will be a mistake. France should remember that their mere presence reminds local authorities and countries in the region of their own failure, so no need to add insult to injury by ignoring their help and refusing to involve them in operations taken place in their own country.

All actors think regional and act local. This sounds like an old cliche, but it could not be more relevant in this case.  Most situations these interventions are supposed to address require a regional approach that goes beyond the original theater of operations. These conflicts are part of conflict systems that engulf not only the ground zero of the crisis but also countries in the front-line. Therefore any intervention should take into consideration factors such as regional political alliances, transnational ethnic dynamics, religion and cross border issues.

Africans to increase regional military and diplomatic cooperation. As unfortunate as these crises maybe, French interventions offer African armies the opportunity to work together, harmonize their operations and develop joint strategies and operations to deal with increasingly complex and transnational crises that affect several countries in the region. They will have to learn work together on both military and diplomatic fronts to mitigate the adverse effects of these French interventions while at the same time leveraging them to strengthen their own capabilities, such as the long overdue African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC)  and the African Stand by Force.

It is worth mentioning that, if France is adapting its intervention strategy, it does not mean that it has tempered or changed its perception on Africa.  Many in the business and political community in France still consider French speaking Africa as” France’s backyard.” The history of relations between France and French speaking Africa teaches us that interventions are not altruistic or cost free for Africans. In the past, these interventions have helped France’s interests in the region; there are no reasons to believe the contrary today. This fact is confirmed by a series of report funded by the French government, all of which argue for the key role Africa will play in the prosperity of France;” this is clearly illustrated by the title of the recent French Senate report: “Africa is our future.”

Therefore, African countries cannot cheer-lead their way out of the crises facing the region, they should do more to actively engage and assist.  These French interventions may not mark the return of the colonial cop; however, they are signs of a turning point in the relations between France and Francophone Africa. Will African states and the African Union seize the moment and bend the arc of these relations toward cooperation, peace and security as claimed by France or towards neo-colonialism as suspected by skeptics? Qui vivra, verra!