Monthly Archives: March 2014

Conflit en Casamance : Peut-être la lumière au bout du tunnel ?

27 Thursday Mar 2014

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Le 14 octobre 2013, les représentants du gouvernement sénégalais et ceux du MFDC (groupe irrédentiste en Casamance au Sénégal) ont tenu une importante réunion. Celle-ci avait pour facilitateur la Communauté de Sant’Egidio. Cette importante réunion a permis de mettre en place un cadre commun des négociations de paix pour mettre un terme à l’un des plus longs conflits en Afrique subsaharienne. Certes prometteur, le processus est néanmoins menacé par des facteurs et des choix qui ont torpillés les précédents processus de paix.

Le 26 décembre 1982, la crise en Casamance au Sénégal a dégénéré en manifestations pour l’indépendance à Ziguinchor sa capitale régionale. Ces manifestations ont conduit à la mise aux arrêts de nombreux dirigeants du mouvement séparatiste casamançais le MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance). D’autres réactions du gouvernement ont mis le feu aux poudres et déclenché un conflit armé toujours en cours. C’est l’une des guerres civiles les plus longues encore en cours en Afrique. Bien que n’étant pas aussi meurtrier que certains des conflits sur le continent, ce conflit à basse intensité (attaques et affrontements sporadiques à l’aide d’armes légères et les mines) a néanmoins coûté la vie à environ 3 000 à 5 000 personnes entre 1982 et 2010. La situation actuelle en Casamance reste celle de « ni guerre, ni paix » bouleversée de temps en temps par des affrontements sporadiques et meurtriers de la part du gouvernement et de certaines factions rebelles. Cette situation a plombé le développement dans cette région, créé un terrain propice au banditisme, aux conflits communaux localisés et à la contrebande de toutes sortes de produits (drogues illégales, bois, armes légères et autres biens); par ailleurs, cette économie de la guerre est alimentée par l’instabilité en Guinée Bissau, qui est devenue une plateforme internationale du narcotrafic. La population locale est prise au piège dans un système de conflit qui implique le Sénégal, la Gambie, et la Guinée Bissau.

En dépit de la menace régionale que représente le conflit de la Casamance, il n’existe pas d’effort soutenu de la part de la communauté internationale pour un processus de paix. Peut-être cette fois-ci, la donne est en train de changer!

Depuis 1982, il y a eu de nombreuses tentatives pour ramener la paix dans cette partie du Senegal. En outre, de nombreux accords de cessez-le feu ont été signés depuis 1991. La Gambie et la Guinée Bissau ont facilité certains des ces accords. Le premier avait été signé le 31 mai 1991, à Cacheu en Guinée Bissau. Toutefois, le Front Sud (une des factions) du MFDC n’a jamais accepté l’accord du cessez-le feu. De nombreux autres suivront jusqu’au dernier accord partiel de paix signé le 30 décembre 2004 uniquement par une faction du MFDC. Cet accord de 2004 n’a apporté ni paix ni solution au conflit.

Compte tenu de la « factionalisation » du MFDC, la plupart de ces initiatives de paix n’ont jamais reçu le soutien de l’ensemble du mouvement, causant donc l’échec de chacun des accords ou initiatives. Le MFDC n’est pas le seul acteur fautif, car le gouvernement sénégalais également n’a pas apporté son soutien aux solutions fiables de paix en raison de l’absence de coordination et de suivi des engagements politiques et économiques.

Toutefois, le récent processus de médiation commencé en Octobre 2013 et facilité par la Communauté Sant’Egidio est porteur d’espoir. Tous les efforts semblent aller vers la paix, grâce à la conjugaison de plusieurs facteurs donc : la lassitude de la guerre chez les populations, des réunions informelles récurrentes et des initiatives de paix émanant des différents acteurs tant au niveau local que national, le paysage politique en mutation au Sénégal en raison de l’élection du Président Macky Sall, qui a promis de mettre un terme à ce conflit, et le retour de certaines agences internationales de développement. Ces macro tendances sont également appuyées par des actions concrètes telles que : la décision prise par le gouvernement sénégalais d’annuler le mandat d’arrêt lancé contre un des dirigeants du MFDC en la personne de Salif Sadio, la libération par le MFDC de 09 démineurs pris en otage, le rôle actif de médiation joué par la Communauté de Sant’Egidio.
Par cntre, cette nouvelle démarche pour la paix en Casamance n’est pas exempte des décisions et difficultés qui ont plombées les précédents processus de paix :

L’absence d’une approche globale de la part du gouvernement du Sénégal (GoS) – Le risque pour le gouvernement Sénégalais est double : absence d’une approche générale et envoi de nombreux émissaires. Le Président Macky Sall, n’a pas entretenu de secret sur le fait que la paix en Casamance fera partie de son lègue pour le pays. Jusqu’ici, la promesse et probablement la mise en exécution du plan de développement doté de 35 millions d’euros financé en partie par la Banque mondiale et qui donne la priorité à l’agriculture, aux routes et autres secteurs sensibles, permettront de résoudre les problèmes concrets de développement et les griefs qui ont alimentés le conflit pendant si longtemps. Mais en l’absence d’un cadre politique et d’une voie de sortie, les leaders du MFDC pourraient ne pas être motivés à rechercher réellement la paix. Dans sa quête d’une issue politique, le gouvernement du Sénégal devrait éviter le paradigme conflictuel actuel qui est celui d’« Unité nationale ou rien » Vs. « Indépendance ou rien »; mais plutôt recadrer les problèmes en termes de gouvernance participative et décentralisation. Ce cadre offre plus d’options que la dichotomie simpliste d’indépendance vs. intégrité territoriale du Sénégal.
Par ailleurs, l’une des stratégies de l’ancien président Wade était l’utilisation d’émissaires, que l’on appelait communément «Monsieur Casamance ». Cette stratégie a lamentablement échoué et à plutôt favoriser un réseau de corruption. Il est important pour le GoS de limiter le nombre d’intermédiaires avec le MFDC. La responsabilisation de l’ancien Maire de Ziguinchor, Mr. Robert Sagna en tant que chef négociateur pour le gouvernement permettrait de clarifier et de mieux articuler les positions du gouvernement.

Le risque de « factionalisation » continue du MFDC – La division au sein du MFDC a toujours constitué un défi à relever. Le rapprochement entre Ousmane Niantang Diatta et César Atoute Badiate du Front Sud est un signe encourageant. Mais le différend qui oppose le Front Sud (Diatta et Badiate) au Front Nord (Salif Sadio) constitue une grave menace. Le Front Nord souhaite négocier directement avec le gouvernement du Sénégal tandis que les sudistes veulent premièrement un dialogue au sein du MFDC avant de passer à la négociation avec le gouvernement. Si par le passé, le gouvernement du Sénégal a profité de la division au sein du MFDC, cette fois-ci, un MFDC moins divisé favorable à la paix pourrait être profitable à l’instauration de la paix.

Le risque de discuter avec les radicaux en ignorant les modérés – Les discussions à Rome ont commencé avec Salif Sadio, chef de la plus radicale des factions du MFDC. La Communauté de Sant’Egidio doit avoir probablement agi suivant le vieil adage qui dit que « l’on négocie avec ses ennemis et non pas avec ses amis ». Le résultat a été la frustration croissante du Front Sud de Cesar Batoute et Diatta. Il est temps de ramener à la table des négociations toutes les factions ainsi que les pays voisins que sont la Guinée Bissau et la Gambie. Suivant mon argumentaire ci-dessus, le conflit casamançais est le moteur d’un système de conflit qui part de Banjul en Gambie à Bissau en Guinée Bissau, par conséquent, les pays voisins font autant partie du problème que de la solution.

Ce sont là des défis complexes, les aborder nécessitera leadership et créativité de la part de tous les acteurs impliqués ! Mon espoir c’est de voir le peuple de la Casamance connaître enfin le dénouement de ce long conflit.

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Conflict in Casamance, Senegal: The light at the end of a “30 years” long tunnel?

27 Thursday Mar 2014

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On October 14th, 2013 an important meeting was held between representatives of the Government of Senegal and those of the MFDC (irredentist group in Casamance, Senegal). The meeting was facilitated by the Community of Sant’Egidio. This important meeting resulted to a common framework for peace negotiations to end one of the most protracted conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. While promising, the process is threatened by factors and choices that have doomed previous peace processes.

On December 26, 1982, the tension in Casamance, Senegal erupted in a pro-independence demonstration, which was staged in the regional capital, Ziguinchor. The demonstration led to the arrest of several leaders of the Casamance separatist movement, known as the MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance). Subsequent government’s responses triggered an ongoing armed conflict. The conflict in Casamance is one of the Africa’s longest running civil wars. Although not as lethal as some of the intractable conflicts on the continent, this low-intensity conflict (sporadic fighting and attacks using light weapons and land mines) has nonetheless cost the lives of approximately 3,000 – 5,000 people between 1982 and 2010. The current situation in Casamance remains that of “no war, no peace” tainted by sporadic but deadly attacks from both the government and some rebels factions. This situation has stymied development in the region, created a fertile ground for banditry, localized communal conflicts and illegal trafficking of all kind of products ( illegal drugs, timber, small arms and other commodities); furthermore, this economy of war is fueled by the instability in Guinea Bissau, which has become an international platform for narco-trafficking. The local population is trapped in a conflict system that engulfs Senegal, Gambia, and Guinea Bissau.

Despite the regional threats that the Casamance conflict represents, there has not been a sustained and collaborative effort by the international community to support a peace process in Casamance.

Maybe this time around, things are about to change!

Since 1982, there have been multiple attempts to bring about peace in the Casamance. Furthermore, there have been multiple cease fires since 1991. Gambia and Guinea Bissau facilitated some of the cease fires. The first cease fire was signed on May 31, 1991, in Cacheu, Guinea Bissau. However, the Southern Front (one of the factions) of the MFDC never accepted the cease fire agreement. This partial cease-fire held until 1993. Many cease fires followed until the last partial peace accord signed in December 30, 2004 by only one faction of the MFDC. The 2004 accord did not bring peace or a solution to the conflict either.

Given the fractionalization of the MFDC, most of these peace initiatives never received the support of the entire movement, thus defeating the purpose of each of the agreements or initiatives. The MFDC is not the only player at fault, as the Government of Senegal has also failed to support viable paths to peace because of the lack of coordination and follow-up of political and economic commitments.

However, the recent mediation process started in October 2013 and facilitated by the Community of Sant’Egidio carries the promise of a resolution. There seems to be a momentum toward peace, created by several factors, namely: the war fatigue among the population, sustained informal meetings and peace initiatives by various stakeholders both at local and national level, the changing political landscape in Senegal with the election of President Macky Sall, who has promised to bring this conflict to an end; and the return of some international development agencies. These macro trends are also supported by concrete actions such as: The decision by the government of Senegal to cancel the arrest warrant against Salif Sadio one of the leaders of MFDC; also the release by the MFDC of the 09 mine clearers held hostages; and the active role of mediation been played by the Community of Sant’Egidio.

This new momentum for peace in Casamance is not immune from the ills that have plummeted previous peace processes:

Lack of holistic approach by the Government of Senegal (GoS) – The risk for the government of Senegal is two-fold: lack of a comprehensive approach and the use of multiple emissaries. President Macky Sall has made no secret of the fact the peace in Casamance will be part of his legacy. So far, the promise and hopefully the implementation of the development plan of 35 millions euros funded in part by the World Bank and prioritizing agriculture, road and other critical sectors, will help address concrete development issues and grievances that have fueled the conflict for so long. But in the absence of a political framework and way out, the leadership of the MFDC may not be encouraged to genuinely pursuit peace. In looking for political avenue, the GoS should avoid the frame of “National Unity or nothing” Vs. “Independence or nothing”; instead reframe the issues in terms of participative governance and decentralization. This frame opens more options than the simplistic dichotomy of independence vs. territorial integrity of Senegal.

One of the key strategies to address the conflict under President Abdoulaye Wade was the use of emissaries that reported to him directly. These individuals were also called “Monsieur Casamance” by the general public and were supposed to conduct pre-negotiation talks with various factions of the MFDC. They were given important financial resources with no clear scope of work or obligation to justify their use of funds. The use of emissaries has raised a lot of concerns due to high risks of corruption and embezzlement of this strategy. For the moment, former mayor of Ziginchor, Mr. Robert Sagna is leading the discussions on behalf of the Government. He should be supported and empowered to be the only lead negotiator on behalf of the GoS.

The risk of continued fractionalization of the MFDC – The fractionalization of the MFDC has always posed a challenge to previous peace initiatives. The rapprochement between Ousmane Niantang Diatta and César Atoute Badiate in the Southern front is a good sign. But the rift that opposes the Southern front (Diatta and Badiate) and Northern front (Salif Sadio) is a major threat. The latter wants to negotiate directly with the Government of Senegal and the first wants an inter-MFDC dialogue before any negotiation with the government. If in the past, the GoS has used the fractionalization of the MFDC to its advantage, this time a less divided MFDC supportive of peace may be to the advantage of peace.

The risk of talking to radicals and sidelining the moderates – The discussions in Rome started with Salif Sadio, head of the most radical of the MFDC factions. The Community of Sant’Egidio must have probably operated under the old saying that you “negotiate with your enemies not your friends”. The result has been a growing frustration of the moderate Southern Front of Cesar Batoute and Diatta. It is time to bring into the process all the factions and also neighboring countries of Guinea –Bissau and Gambia. As I have argued before, the Casamance conflict is the engine of a conflict system that stretches from Banjul in Gambia to Bissau in Guinea Bissau. So, neighboring countries are part of the problem as well as the solution.

These are complex challenges, addressing them will require creativity and leadership from all stakeholders involved! I hope the people of Casamance will finally see an end to this protracted conflict.

Central Africa Republic – A Multifaceted Crisis

24 Monday Mar 2014

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By Anym Ngu-Muthi, in Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR).
Guest contributor

Over a year after the crisis in the CAR started, the road to recovery is still a long way away. Several mediations and transition governments later, the country is still marred by sectarian violence fueled by a vicious cycle of anger felt by both Muslims and Christians. The crisis in CAR is multidimensional with a huge impact on the political, humanitarian, economic, social and security sectors.

POLITICAL: Problems started for Ex-President Francois Bozize when he failed to adhere to the 2012 Libreville accord. Seleka, a coalition of several rebel groups finally captured Bangui and seized power on the 24th of March 2013. What everyone thought would be the usual violence-free transition from one authority to another in a country with a history of coup d’etats (4 out of the 6 previous leaders came to power through a coup d’état) was not to be. The difference being that the Seleka coalition contained foreign militias (mainly from Chad and Sudan) who were seeking to be rewarded when the mission was accomplished. And so in the months that followed the (new) Presidency of Seleka Leader Michel Djotodia, rampant looting and summary killings became the norm. The lack of control on the different factions that was Seleka combined with the lack of trust of the National Military (believed to be pro-Bozize) meant that the Seleka rebels were left to operate in a lawless environment with utmost impunity.
The continued atrocities committed by Ex-Seleka (the group was disbanded by Djotodia in September 2013) against the mostly Christian community, particularly in the area of Bossangoa (the birth region of Bozize) led to the creation of an auto-defence group known as Anti-Balaka. The evolution of this group from a self defence group to an outright rebel group with military-type offensive strategies adds to the deepening crisis that is the CAR.
In an attempt to curb the worsening violence in the CAR, ECCAS held a Summit in Ndjamena in January 2014 during which the then Head of the Transitional Government, M. Djotodia resigned in the hope that a newly elected transitional Government will be able to turn things around. Instead, what immediately followed was weeks of more instability. And so the current Government of President Catherine Samba-Panza, the first female President of the CAR (3rd in Africa), takes up the mantle in what is hoped will be an effective and ‘peaceful’ transition until elections are held in 2015.
The CAR has had 3 HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (2 TRANSITIONAL) IN LESS THAN A YEAR BETWEEN MARCH 2013 AND JANUARY 2014.

HUMANITARIAN: Events in CAR have generated a major humanitarian crisis with large numbers of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). As of February 2014, the United Nations reported that 2.5 million half of the country’s population were in need of assistance; over 1000,000 IDPs are in 115 makeshift sites/host communities; 413,094 IDPs in 60 sites in Bangui alone (almost half the population of Bangui); 250,000 Central African refugees have fled to neighbouring countries, mainly Chad, Cameroon and the DRC; 31,483 third-country nationals (mainly Muslims) have been evacuated as a result of the sectarian violence; The UN has activated its highest level (L3) emergency response in the CAR and although progress has been made a lot of challenges still remain. Unfortunately the difficult security environment in the country and the targeting of NGOs in certain areas, means that humanitarian work is either being delayed or interrupted.
Ethnic cleansing targeting the minority Muslim population has left them seeking refuge in IDP camps across the city or opting/forced to leave the CAR at the earliest opportunity. The withdrawal of Seleka rebels from certain parts of the country has also left the Muslim population vulnerable to attacks by the mostly Christian Anti-Balaka.

ECONOMICAL: The Central African Republic is a land-locked country, relying heavily on neighbouring countries, particularly Cameroon, for importation of both agricultural and non food items. Not only were Muslims targeted in reprisal killings but their homes and business were looted and completely destroyed. The majority of wholesale businesses are run by the Muslim community and this sector of the economy has all but collapsed with the mass exodus of Muslims from the CAR. During the heart of the crisis the border between Cameroon and the CAR at Beloko was closed resulting in several hundred commercial trucks, carrying vital supplies, stranded at the border. The result? A shortage of basic commodities and a hike in food prices. This vital transportation route between Cameroon and Bangui is now under the control of Anti-Balaka rebels, with movement by commercial trucks on this axis requiring armed escorts by African Union Peace Keepers.
The lack of economic activities and the breakdown of Government institutions means that the government is unable to generate much needed revenue and therefore not able to pay civil servants (3 months arrears owed as of February 2014). While Ms Samba Panza’s Government is trying hard to resolve this backlog of salary payments, the sudden release of cash into the market, (chasing fewer goods) could have a negative impact. Therefore, this process needs to be carefully managed.

SOCIAL: The Education and health care systems have not been spared in the crisis. It is often said that one should try not to fall sick in the CAR – at least not with anything more complicated than malaria or the flu. This is because there are no more than a handful of clinics able to treat but the basic medical conditions and the hospitals are poorly equipped. The standard of healthcare in is wanting at best. The ongoing violence is simply adding weight to an already struggling health system.
During periods of violence, schools shut down for extended periods and the school year has been disrupted. Many children have been out of school since December, although private institutions are slowly resuming as of February 2014.

SECURITY: Best described as volatile and unpredictable – a few days of relative calm are usually followed by eruption of violence. The sound of gunshots, sometimes with heavy weapons, is a daily occurrence. Both rebel groups have contributed to the insecurity currently being experience. Ex-Seleka rebels looted and committed grave atrocities in the months following their successful overthrow of the Bozize Government against the majority Christian population.
In December 2013, an attack against Seleka by anti-Balaka in Bangui saw over 1000 people killed in a few weeks of intense armed clashes between the two groups. This coincided with the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of AU peace keepers (MISCA) and French Forces (Sangaris) in the CAR. An outbreak of violence quickly followed throughout the country and saw the imposition of a country wide curfew from 6pm, later relaxed to 8pm in the February 2014. Sustained killings and looting targeting the Muslim population (and remaining Ex-Seleka elements) has resulted in the use of the word genocide in certain quarters.
The crime rate is on the increase by an unhindered Anti-Balaka as well as unidentified armed criminal gangs (claiming to be anti Balaka), taking advantage of the lawlessness.
February 2014 saw the withdrawal of a majority of the now weakened Ex-Seleka from Bangui (as well as the southern and western part of the country) to the North East and East. In the same vane Anti-Balaka are in control of the South and Western part of the country.
The presence of International peace keeping forces has been both positive and negative. While they have been able to mediate and quell very highly tense situations, they have also been in direct confrontation with the civilian population causing deaths. Insufficient numbers is the main reason for the continued and unabated widespread violence, some of which is as a result of anti French sentiments amongst the population and rebel groups. A timid effort at disarming the militia groups has been made although this has tended to concentrate on Ex-Seleka. According to recent reports, Anti-Balaka are showing a willingness to disarm if Ex-Seleka do the same.
The crime rate will continue to rise as rebel groups and other criminal gangs continue to seek dwindling resources in CAR’s battered economy with few goods available. Reprisal killings between Muslim and Christian communities are likely to go on for the foreseeable future.
The occupation of the North and Eastern part of the CAR (rich in natural resources) by Seleka is believed to be strategic and a partition of the country along sectarian/religious lines is a real concern. The possibility of launching another attack on Bangui cannot be ruled out.

The presence of other rebel groups (RJ – Revolution for Justice; FPR – Front pour le renouveau) in the North West of the country also changes the dynamics as their objectives are not quite clear. The involvement of extremist groups such as Boko Haram and AQIM has been mentioned although no evidence of their activities has been seen to date.
The UN Secretary General has recently called for an expansion of peace-keeping troops in the CAR. The expansion of Sangaris (600 more troops) and extension of its mandate, the proposed deployment of 1000 EU troops and the possible establishment of the DPKO mission proposed by the SG, will likely have a positive impact on the crisis and perhaps bring to an end this turmoil and persistent instability in the heart of Africa.