Category Archives: African conflicts

Conflict management training for peacekeepers – Lessons and recommendations

11 Monday Dec 2017

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Since 2008, USIP’s Academy has trained more than five thousand peacekeepers in more conflict management skills of conflict analysis, negotiation, mediation, and the protection of civilians. Based on interviews with returned peacekeepers trained by USIP, community members in mission areas, and trainers, this report assesses the relevance and effectiveness of this training program—and offers key recommendations to improve the content, design, and delivery of conflict management training more broadly.

To download the report click here: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR411-Conflict-Management-Training-for-Peacekeepers.pdf

 

Summary

  • USIP’s Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding has conducted conflict management training for peacekeepers since 2008. In 2014 the Academy began an assessment of this training to determine its relevance and effectiveness.
  • The assessment reveals that USIP’s training on communication, negotiation, and mediation is relevant to the needs of peacekeepers and helps them defuse conflicts in mission. In dealings with the civilian population, peacekeepers recognize the intersection between communication, respect, and cultural understanding.
  • Peacekeepers see negotiation skills as key to effective peacekeeping. They use these skills in a range of contexts, including with the local population, with parties to the conflict, and within their battalion; and they often continue to use negotiation skills in personal and professional contexts when they return home.
  • Community members seek a better understanding of peacekeepers’ mission and more constructive engagement with peacekeepers.
  • To engage with communities, peacekeepers must develop a mindset that is conducive to problem solving, as well as relevant knowledge, skills, and attitudes, during their pre-deployment training.
  • Peacekeepers’ performance in protecting civilians is inconsistent.
  • The UN’s ambiguous language around sexual exploitation and abuse creates confusion for peacekeepers and poses challenges to compliance.
  • Peacekeepers benefit from the practical exercises, role plays, and simulations included in their training, which give them plenty of opportunity to apply skills. In general, a participant-centered approach whose focus is not primarily military adds value to pre-deployment training.

 

 

Integrated development through the prism of governance (audio)

19 Friday Feb 2016

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The births of almost half the world’s children are not registered, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund. Without a birth certificate, children will face barriers in accessing health care, education and other basic services.

Source: Integrated development through the prism of governance (audio)

Ménage à Trois: Boko Haram, Oil Prices and Climate Change

08 Monday Feb 2016

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The confluence of violent extremism, drop in oil prices and climate change is profoundly changing socio-economic dynamics in the Lake Chad region, consequently our understanding of violent extremism and how to respond to it. Boko Haram is taking notice, but can the same be said of governments and international donors engaged in the fight against violent extremism in the region?
Boko Haram – Last week, Boko Haram (BH) made news by killing more than 80 people in the village of Dalori in Borno State, Nigeria. I have lost count of Boko Haram attacks in Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria. These attacks have taken place despite increasing military pressure from countries of the Lake Chad Basin region with the support of Western Powers including the United States.
Since 2015 Boko Haram has lost a good number of villages and towns, but not its lethality. It has gone on to become the deadliest terrorist group in history (more than 20,000 killed between 2009 and 2016). The loss of territory has in fact mislead some analysts and officials including President Buhari of Nigeria, to announce the defeat of Boko Haram. It is fair to say that the Nigerian army has achieved some military successes such as, seizing major towns and cutting supply routes, among other things. But it is too early to claim victory. The organization has temporarily shifted from a territory-centric strategy (control of territory) to increased targeted suicide attacks on soft targets, the use of female suicide bombers, harassments of local businesses, and propaganda. As previously discussed in this blog, BH hopes that governments of the region will respond to its spectacular attacks with brutal and indiscriminate military offensives, which will inevitably create abuses and victims among innocent populations and eventually de-legitimize security forces and play into Boko Haram’s advantage. Boko Haram has used this tactical shift in the past with noticeable success.

In sum, the multiplication of Boko Haram attacks amidst loss of territory should not be necessarily considered a sign of despair or agony, but rather a coping mechanism, a Machiavellian plan to push governments and military of the regions to recreate the conditions both “pull” (grievances, illegitimacy, discredit of security forces) and “push” (poverty, corruption, communal tensions) that have propelled BH in the gruesome circle of violent extremist organizations. In addition to this shift in strategy BH has its job cut out for it by two unexpected bedfellows: The drop in oil prices and climate change.

Drop in oil prices – Three of the countries waging the fight against violent extremist groups (Boko Haram, Ansaru and other local groups) in the lake Chad neighborhood are also oil producing countries and revenues from oil constitute an important revenue stream for these governments. For instance, in Nigeria, the oil and gas sector accounts for about 35 percent of gross domestic product, and petroleum exports revenue represents over 90 percent of total exports revenue, roughly 70% of government revenues (according to Government and OPEC data). In Cameroon, oil revenues represent roughly 40% of export revenues and 20% in government revenues. In Chad oil revenues constitute about 48% of government revenues. These countries were forecasting in their 2015-2016 budget an average price of 70 $US a barrel, with a barrel currently below 40 $US and future prospects not looking good, these countries will experience some cutbacks, and possibly worst. They will have to make difficult choices between sustaining their military engagement against BH and keeping their promises of addressing humanitarian, economic and infrastructural projects in regions mostly affected by violent extremism and terrorism amidst dramatic loss of revenues. But this difficult dilemma may also be a blessing, as it could push these countries to review their strategy and strike a smart balance between military approaches that take into consideration the new BH strategy and much needed non-military interventions that are structural in nature but targeted to community needs, for example, the adoption of so much needed land administration reforms policy (structural change) in Cameroon that secure and provide easy access to land ownership for local farmers in North Cameroon.

Climate change –Climate change is a brutal reality in the Lake Chad region. The region is experiencing radical and erratic weather conditions with longer periods of drought that are affecting food production. The adverse effects of climate change are destroying most local economic value chains including: fishing, agricultural, dairy and meat products. Local farmers, cattle owners and fishermen are caught between increased Boko Haram taxes and decreased revenues due to loss of productivity. Entire communities are witnessing the gradual erosion of their livelihood and resilience. Herders’ and farmers’ communities are fighting over shrinking arable land. For some young people in communities in Northern Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad, joining Boko Haram has become a viable option to ensure one’s livelihood and family’s survival.

The drop in oil prices, albeit temporary (hopefully) is eroding capacities of government to respond comprehensively (military and non-military responses) to the threat posed by violent extremism. The effects of climate change are aggressively destroying communities and people’s livelihoods and pitching communities against each other (pastoralists vs. farmers; IDPs vs. host communities, etc.). Boko Haram is exploiting these dynamics. BH clearly has a regional strategy with the end goal of building a caliphate in the region of the Lake Chad basin. While its strategy is regional, its operations are decentralized and local. BH leverages its good knowledge of local contexts and local loyalties to, on one hand, exploit communities and individuals’ frustrations due to government’s unresponsiveness and deficiencies (corruption, abuses, etc.), and on the other hand, exacerbate communities’ vulnerabilities aggravated by climate change among other factors.

Understanding violent extremism in this new context requires exploring the complex links between the traditional hypothesized drivers of violent extremism (grievances, perception of injustice, sense of belonging, poverty, corruption, among other factors) and micro and macro phenomena that affect governments’ capacities and actions, local communities’ vulnerabilities and resilience and violent extremist organizations (VEO) adaptive and coping mechanisms. It means integrating macro phenomena at regional level with local experiences of these phenomena at the levels of communities and individuals. Personal stories and experiences become powerful mediums of information and understanding. Boko Haram uses them to build its appealing narrative and inform its actions.

Therefore, to effectively address violent extremism in the region and effectively defeat groups like Boko Haram, governments and international actors should recognize the complexity of the situation from a regional perspective, commit to sustained multi-sectoral efforts, informed by local realities. While smart and targeted military interventions are still necessary, integrated or multi-sectoral non-military interventions informed by ongoing assessments of both regional and local communities’ aspirations, vulnerabilities and resilience are crucial. Yes, it is fair to say the situation in the region is complex, involving many diverse, yet interconnected elements. That is why a military solution or a development approach alone is no match.

Governments from the region and international actors will have to think regionally, design comprehensively and act locally. We are in for a long haul!

Boko Haram: Will Nigeria and the Neighboring Countries Win the Fight but Lose the Peace?

02 Tuesday Jun 2015

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Since March 2015 there have been noticeable military successes against Boko Haram in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The most important victory in my view is the liberation on April 2015 of hundreds of women and children held captives in Sambisa forest, Northeastern Nigeria and used by Boko Haram as sex slaves, porters and even human bombs. Today, the terrain-centric strategy that helped Boko Haram control a territory larger than Belgium (about 15% of Nigeria), has been limited by the military coalition composed of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, causing the violent extremist group to lose ground. Its latest decision to rename itself “Islamic States’ West Africa,” an affiliate of DAESH (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), may be a sign that things are not working in their favor, but it could also announce a change of tactics and heightening in lethality and brutality, mirroring the horror we are constantly seeing in Syria, Iraq and Libya where the so-called DAESH is in control.

In his inaugural address last Friday, May 29, 2015, the newly elected president of Nigeria, President Buhari showed his resolve to defeat Boko Haram by announcing the relocation of the Military command and control center of the counter-insurgency against Boko Haram to Maiduguri, the group’s birthplace. This move demonstrates the President’s intention to bring military leadership closer to the point of action, while also grounding the military decision-making process in the realities of the battlefield. This move also sends a symbolic message to the terrorists, which states: “We are bringing the fight to you…” But Boko Haram did not wait long to respond. Before the last guest to the inaugural party left the capital city, Abuja, Boko Haram conducted several attacks in Maiduguri, killing more than 20 people and destroying buildings, including a Mosque.

While the resolve of the president and his willingness to work with neighboring countries is commendable, his exclusive focus on security and military responses is limited. Nigeria has been down that road before, specifically in 2009, when the group was crushed by the Nigerian military and some of its hard core members forced into hiding, only to come back stronger, more determined and blood thirsty than ever. Unlike other conflicts West Africa has witnessed in such countries as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, etc., which offered possibilities of peace agreements, followed by Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs, fights against terrorists groups do not generally lead to DDR. In the case of Boko Haram, a military victory like the one in 2009 will likely mean that Shekau and some of his lieutenants are killed, forced into hiding or captured but the majority of foot soldiers will vanish into neighboring towns and villages in the Lake Chad region. These combatants will more likely constitute local criminal groups, moving on to terrorize truck and bus drivers and their passengers on major roads, steal from cattle raisers and farmers throughout different towns in the region, while awaiting their next recruiters, be they disgruntled politicians who’ve lost elections or charismatic religious leaders with a political agenda.

George Santayana, the Italian philosopher once warned the world a century ago: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” I hope our leaders remember!

Military victories in the fight against violent extremism can only provide narrow windows of opportunity for peace and development work. They are not solutions. Defeating Boko Haram and winning lasting peace in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region will require a fundamental shift in the thinking of leaders. A shift that gives equal focus if not, priority to nonmilitary interventions that address reasons why Boko Haram’s leaders are able to mobilize, train, pay and equip so many combatants, some of whom were learning to operate weapons for the first time. Nigeria nor any of the countries fighting Boko Haram cannot militarize his way out of the issues Boko Haram is thriving upon, including socioeconomic exclusion, systemic corruption, poverty, abuses by security forces and a general sense of abandonment that leads some young men and women to radicalization.

There is no shortcut to the painstaking yet crucial work of socioeconomic reconstruction, restoration of rule of law, and local participation in decision-making. Leaders of the Lake Chad Region will have to commit and show resolve in the reconstruction front as well. Some private organizations are already implementing development projects in the Lake Chad region. However, without clear commitment and support from regional leaders, these projects may just be Band-Aids, rather than sustained, comprehensive and integrated reconstruction initiatives that are needed at both local and regional levels.

Is the fight against Boko Haram reshaping regional cooperation in Africa?

23 Monday Feb 2015

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Boko Haram is waging one of the deadliest hybrid wars (both conventional and asymmetric) Africa has ever seen. While the consequences are devastating and costly both in terms of human lives and property; paradoxically, this conflict is also contributing positively to a nascent form of results-driven cooperation between countries of the Lake Chad basin (Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and Niger) in the frontline of this conflict.

As I look at the evolving situation, I can’t help but to think of a book by Lewis Coser, which I read more than a decade ago: The Functions of Social Conflict. In this book, Coser identifies one of the functions of social conflict to be the reinforcement of in-group cohesion in a conflict against an out-group, when there is already some level of order and centralization. Inversely, he continues, conflict can lead to the disintegration of the in-group where there is already despotism and division. I argue that the first part of Coser’s argument can explain the nascent results-driven cooperation Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin; while the second part may predict what awaits Nigeria, if the confusion and lack of resolve this country has shown so far, persist.

A new cooperation paradigm may be emerging out of necessity
The existentialist threat posed by Boko Haram seems to have succeeded in accomplishing what more than two decades of relentless diplomatic efforts have not been able to accomplish that is, a results-driven cooperation between countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) now in the frontline of this hybrid war. Since the beginning of 2015, we have observed an unprecedented coordination of military efforts between Chad and Cameroon, joined by Niger and Benin. Not even the devastating impact of climate change on the livelihoods of communities in Lake Chad Basin, nor the vicious and bloody attacks of cross-border banditry were able to bring these countries together to coordinate the simplest patrols.

The picture of Cameroonian and Chadian soldiers sharing a meal together under tents in Kolofata and Fotokol (two of the Cameroonian towns heavily destroyed by Boko Haram attacks); and of President Paul Biya of Cameroon congratulating President Idriss Deby of Chad during a Summit of The ECCAS (Economic Community of Central Africa held on January 16, 2015 in Cameroon), speak volumes. These moments of communion between armed forces and leaders of the two countries have more symbolic and strategic impact than the dozen of treaties and agreements signed between the two countries on other issues of importance.

Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin have engaged more than 7 500 soldiers in the fight. They are coordinating their operations against Boko Haram, sharing intelligence and resources. They may be receiving support from the US, France and other Western powers. However, this outside support while important, is not driving their engagement in the fight. By all accounts, countries of the region are on the front row of this battle. Cameroon is supporting the bulk of non-military supplies and logistics (Gasoline, food, etc.) of the Chadian deployment for example.

During the 24th AU ordinary session in Addis Ababa (January 30th-31st, 2015), in a long awaited move, the African Union endorsed the decision of deploying a regional force of 7 500 soldiers to support countries waging the war against Boko Haram (The plan will be submitted to the UN Security Council). This endorsement is far from adequate; but it has the merit of mutualizing regional resources, and more importantly recognizing the regional threat that is Boko Haram. It brings terrorism in the regional agenda. Africans and communities in the frontline (the borders between Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and Niger) can’t wait for the deployment of the multinational force.

Key questions for the future

Are Cameroon, Chad and Niger re-writing the rules of international security cooperation, particularly the expected role of Western Powers when dealing with regional terrorist groups like Boko Haram? These countries, Cameroon first, took matters into their own hands. Cameroon deployed thousands troops along the border with Nigeria, dealt successfully with several hostage situations involving Westerners and Chinese in the hands of Boko Haram; while fighting relentlessly against them in border towns with Nigeria. Then Chad joined in to carry the fight to Boko Haram in Nigeria. These countries did not expect nor wait for the West to send in troops or financial resources. They are staying the course in a sort of “pull strategy”, seeming to say: “We will deal with this problem ourselves; we would like you to help us; but we will not wait for your help, nor allow you to dictate the terms of the help.” It is worth reminding that Cameroon, Chad and Niger have a security cooperation agreements with France, the same legal framework that France invoked to act in Cote d’Ivoire and recently in Mali.

Is the fight against Boko Haram helping sketch a new template of how Africa can work together to solve wicked and complex African problems? A template of a results driven cooperation based on neighboring countries working together, and the African Union marshalling resources at regional and international level to support country and sub-regional efforts. Will this cooperation that has started in the military front move to other strategic and vital sectors, such as trade, environmental, transport and free movement of goods? Let’s hope so.

It may be too early to consider this military cooperation against Boko Haram as the emergence of a new template of an African results-driven regional cooperation. It may be too premature to argue that armed forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin are midwifing the birth of a new paradigm of African solidarity. A form of solidarity that is born out of necessity sure, but based on African strengths first. In this new paradigm, the US and the West have smartly chosen to stay in the waiting room (maybe out necessity and constraints); waiting to be called in to provide needed resources when requested.

Let’s hope that the labor will not be long and painful, as I am afraid it will be!

Boko Haram thriving in an institutional vacuum!

12 Friday Sep 2014

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Boko Haram made a sudden apparition on television screens around the world in April 2014 with the abduction of more than 200 school girls in Chibok. Following the kidnappings, a worldwide campaign “Bring Back our Girls,” was organized to plea for the safe return of these students. The worldwide campaign” as well as other social media outlets inevitably gave Boko Haram undeserved publicity. Today, the transformation of Boko Haram from a marginalized domestic terrorist group initially fighting for systemic changes (end of corruption, impunity, instauration of Sharia Law) in Northern Nigeria; to a terrorist insurgent group controlling swaths of Nigerian territory, exposes the decay and dysfunctions of some key institutions in Nigeria and the region.

Boko Haram means “Western education is forbidden” in Hausa; its official name is “Jamāʿat ʾahl al-sunnah li-l-Daʿwah wa-al-Jihād “ meaning in Arabic “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” Boko Haram started in the 2000s as a Muslim sect under the leadership of the Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf who denounced the corruption of leaders and preached a non-violent way of social change. While advocating for Sharia law; terrorism was not yet part of the group arsenal. The popularity of the leader soared as his criticisms against politicians became louder and resonated with disenfranchised and marginalized youth. In 2009, there were frequent clashes between Boko Haram and security forces. The same year, during a series of raids, the army crushed the group, killed hundreds of followers, destroyed their main mosque, the Al-Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, and arrested its leader Ustaz Yusuf who would be later executed without due process. The group’s remaining members went underground to re-emerge later in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, now more organized, deadly, and committed to the goal of creating a “caliphate Islamic state” in Northern Nigeria.

Most insurgent groups generally go after two main prizes: territory and populations. Their strategies are terrain centric (conquer and hold territory) and population centric (win over and control population) and in most cases, to win over population, these groups will kill people of their own group and leaders who stand against them and intimidate through public display of gruesome acts of violence; they will also attack security apparatus and symbols of state power.
Let’s look at Boko Haram today:

Terrain centric – The goal is to create an Islamic Caliphate in Northern Nigeria. The towns of Bara, Marte, Gamboru Ngala, Dikwa, Bama, Gwoza, Damboa, and Banki in Borno state, and recently Buni Yadi and Bara towns in Yobe state have fallen and Boko Haram is advancing toward Maidaguri the capital city of Borno State.

Population centric – None of these towns have the type of resources Nigeria is so well endowed with, but Boko Haram is also trying to win the hearts and minds of the local population (in their own way) and regulate social relations and interactions. The fall of these towns was done without the kind of mayhem Boko Haram is known for. According to eye witnesses, instead, Boko Haram combatants were preaching and asking people not to be afraid. However, in order to control populations, they will eventually use extreme violence.

Boko Haram violence is not senseless and blind as people may think. It is purposeful and strategically aimed at: a) degrading the state security apparatus, killing, demoralizing, and intimidating individual soldiers; b) provoking the Nigerian army to overreact and alienate the populations they seek to protect (there are reports of the army using child soldiers, harassing civilian populations, and other abuses); and c) stretching the Army thin by mounting attacks in different cities, suicide bombings, kidnappings, bank attacks, and other activities that require important deployment of Nigerian armed forces without impacting Boko Haram capability.
The metamorphosis of Boko Haram from an obscure Islamic sect to a well known terrorist insurgency led by Abubakar Skehau unclothes many institutions in the region:

The Nigerian Army: a paper tiger – The debacle of the more than half of a battalion of the Nigerian Army who found refuge in Cameroon after the fall of the town of Bama (the second largest town of Borno state) is symptomatic of an Army that is demoralized and underequipped. The retreat of more than 500 Nigerian soldiers following a standoff with Boko Haram in Cameroon is really unsettling! We are talking of the Armed forces of the largest economy in Africa, an army of more than 160 000 men and women, with a budget of more than 5 billion US dollars (20% of the country’s GDP). The only logical conclusion is that long gone are the days when Nigerians and countries of the ECOMOG (Liberia and Sierra Leone in particular) could be proud of the Nigerian Army.
One of the most preeminent senators from Kaduna state and member of the Senate Joint National Assembly Committee and former General Hamed Saleh offers the following explanation, as reported in Allafrica.com : “For us to understand why that is happening, we need to go back to the Babangida (Gen. Ibrahim Babangida) era. After the 1990 Okar coup, the Federal Government of Nigeria systematically and comprehensively disarmed the military…All the tanks, all the artillery guns were disarmed and locked up. All the aircraft were parked in Ilorin and other places, flying stopped, training stopped to ensure regime security, not national security…”All the good officers of the Nigerian Army were hounded out of the military…The attendant result was decay. Training was no longer going on at the battalion level, soldiers lost their skills and since then, no additional military equipment was purchased for the Nigerian Army. Even things as little as machine guns were in short supply, ammunition was in short supply…”
This analysis of the Nigerian Army can be applied to many countries of the region where politicians’ mistrust of the Army and their own illegitimacy have transformed the mission of Armed forces from protection of the country to suppression of dissenting politicians and unarmed activists.

The African Union (AU): Missing in Action – On May 17, 2014, France organized and held a Summit on Security in Nigeria and the region. While the list of participants was impressive with the presence of head of states of Cameroon, Benin, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, and representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union, equally noteworthy was the list of absents, particularly the African Union (AU). The AU was simply not welcomed nor invited. Asked why the AU was not invited, one adviser to the French president gave the following answer: “AU has no intelligence capability”; to my knowledge the EU has none either. Beside the Paris Summit, AU itself did not initiate any summit or action to address the issue. This situation is an illustration of the increased apathy of the AU (not necessarily regional economic communities-REC) towards security issues and more unfortunately the lack of trust some African leaders have in this institution when it comes to security matters.

Regional security cooperation: Elusive catch word! – Should the Boko Haram Caliphate become a reality, it will have as neighbors: Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and Niger. It will be a landlocked caliphate. How will it survive? The answer probably lies on how the current insurgency is thriving. Experts argue that Boko Haram makes money by attacking banks, kidnappings, and other illegal endogenous activities. in addition there are ungoverned spaces, corrupt politicians and military officers, and weapon traffickers in these neighboring countries. These favorable factors build on the weak collaboration between security forces of the region and the mutual suspicion that exists among leaders of these border countries who would rather meet in Paris than in Abuja, Ndjamena, Yaoundé, Niamey, or Addis Ababa.

The response of the Nigerian government and neighboring countries so far has been enemy-centric that is, focusing on killing Boko Haram combatants and degrading their capabilities; unfortunately alienating the populations they are supposed to protect. It is worth mentioning that the enemy-centric approach has been so far productive in Cameroon, for the simple reason that Boko Haram has not shown any interest in controlling territory nor population in that country. Apparently it is well served by ransoms it received from kidnappings in Cameroon and the intelligence it receives from young disaffected Cameroonians, some of whom are joining the group for economic reasons. Hopefully, Cameroon will learn from Nigeria’s mistakes and be mindful of the importance of working for and with the local populations and addressing local grievances and sources of disaffection.
Boko Haram will eventually be defeated; unfortunately many people -many girls – will not live to see that day. A lot of innocent blood will be shed and thousands will be displaced and made refugees. It is time for the AU, particularly the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to become proactive and more assertive as far as terrorism is concerned, working closely with other regional bodies; strengthen the collaboration of countries in the region; and rebuild the capacity of the Nigerian military. But in strengthening these institutions to defeat Boko Haram, policy-makers should not forget this principle from the field of medicine and now adopted by development practitioners, that is: “Do no harm” to the populations you are trying to protect. “Do no harm” in this case will also mean implementing “population- sensitive security and military operations” that work with and for the populations, protecting them from physical violence, but respecting their rights and guaranteeing their access to basic services (education, health, shelter, etc.). They should do more than winning the hearts and minds, and leverage local resources so that populations have the means (not only the will) to express their gratitude and support for the Nigerian government and other border countries in the fight against violent extremism.

Conflit en Casamance : Peut-être la lumière au bout du tunnel ?

27 Thursday Mar 2014

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Le 14 octobre 2013, les représentants du gouvernement sénégalais et ceux du MFDC (groupe irrédentiste en Casamance au Sénégal) ont tenu une importante réunion. Celle-ci avait pour facilitateur la Communauté de Sant’Egidio. Cette importante réunion a permis de mettre en place un cadre commun des négociations de paix pour mettre un terme à l’un des plus longs conflits en Afrique subsaharienne. Certes prometteur, le processus est néanmoins menacé par des facteurs et des choix qui ont torpillés les précédents processus de paix.

Le 26 décembre 1982, la crise en Casamance au Sénégal a dégénéré en manifestations pour l’indépendance à Ziguinchor sa capitale régionale. Ces manifestations ont conduit à la mise aux arrêts de nombreux dirigeants du mouvement séparatiste casamançais le MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance). D’autres réactions du gouvernement ont mis le feu aux poudres et déclenché un conflit armé toujours en cours. C’est l’une des guerres civiles les plus longues encore en cours en Afrique. Bien que n’étant pas aussi meurtrier que certains des conflits sur le continent, ce conflit à basse intensité (attaques et affrontements sporadiques à l’aide d’armes légères et les mines) a néanmoins coûté la vie à environ 3 000 à 5 000 personnes entre 1982 et 2010. La situation actuelle en Casamance reste celle de « ni guerre, ni paix » bouleversée de temps en temps par des affrontements sporadiques et meurtriers de la part du gouvernement et de certaines factions rebelles. Cette situation a plombé le développement dans cette région, créé un terrain propice au banditisme, aux conflits communaux localisés et à la contrebande de toutes sortes de produits (drogues illégales, bois, armes légères et autres biens); par ailleurs, cette économie de la guerre est alimentée par l’instabilité en Guinée Bissau, qui est devenue une plateforme internationale du narcotrafic. La population locale est prise au piège dans un système de conflit qui implique le Sénégal, la Gambie, et la Guinée Bissau.

En dépit de la menace régionale que représente le conflit de la Casamance, il n’existe pas d’effort soutenu de la part de la communauté internationale pour un processus de paix. Peut-être cette fois-ci, la donne est en train de changer!

Depuis 1982, il y a eu de nombreuses tentatives pour ramener la paix dans cette partie du Senegal. En outre, de nombreux accords de cessez-le feu ont été signés depuis 1991. La Gambie et la Guinée Bissau ont facilité certains des ces accords. Le premier avait été signé le 31 mai 1991, à Cacheu en Guinée Bissau. Toutefois, le Front Sud (une des factions) du MFDC n’a jamais accepté l’accord du cessez-le feu. De nombreux autres suivront jusqu’au dernier accord partiel de paix signé le 30 décembre 2004 uniquement par une faction du MFDC. Cet accord de 2004 n’a apporté ni paix ni solution au conflit.

Compte tenu de la « factionalisation » du MFDC, la plupart de ces initiatives de paix n’ont jamais reçu le soutien de l’ensemble du mouvement, causant donc l’échec de chacun des accords ou initiatives. Le MFDC n’est pas le seul acteur fautif, car le gouvernement sénégalais également n’a pas apporté son soutien aux solutions fiables de paix en raison de l’absence de coordination et de suivi des engagements politiques et économiques.

Toutefois, le récent processus de médiation commencé en Octobre 2013 et facilité par la Communauté Sant’Egidio est porteur d’espoir. Tous les efforts semblent aller vers la paix, grâce à la conjugaison de plusieurs facteurs donc : la lassitude de la guerre chez les populations, des réunions informelles récurrentes et des initiatives de paix émanant des différents acteurs tant au niveau local que national, le paysage politique en mutation au Sénégal en raison de l’élection du Président Macky Sall, qui a promis de mettre un terme à ce conflit, et le retour de certaines agences internationales de développement. Ces macro tendances sont également appuyées par des actions concrètes telles que : la décision prise par le gouvernement sénégalais d’annuler le mandat d’arrêt lancé contre un des dirigeants du MFDC en la personne de Salif Sadio, la libération par le MFDC de 09 démineurs pris en otage, le rôle actif de médiation joué par la Communauté de Sant’Egidio.
Par cntre, cette nouvelle démarche pour la paix en Casamance n’est pas exempte des décisions et difficultés qui ont plombées les précédents processus de paix :

L’absence d’une approche globale de la part du gouvernement du Sénégal (GoS) – Le risque pour le gouvernement Sénégalais est double : absence d’une approche générale et envoi de nombreux émissaires. Le Président Macky Sall, n’a pas entretenu de secret sur le fait que la paix en Casamance fera partie de son lègue pour le pays. Jusqu’ici, la promesse et probablement la mise en exécution du plan de développement doté de 35 millions d’euros financé en partie par la Banque mondiale et qui donne la priorité à l’agriculture, aux routes et autres secteurs sensibles, permettront de résoudre les problèmes concrets de développement et les griefs qui ont alimentés le conflit pendant si longtemps. Mais en l’absence d’un cadre politique et d’une voie de sortie, les leaders du MFDC pourraient ne pas être motivés à rechercher réellement la paix. Dans sa quête d’une issue politique, le gouvernement du Sénégal devrait éviter le paradigme conflictuel actuel qui est celui d’« Unité nationale ou rien » Vs. « Indépendance ou rien »; mais plutôt recadrer les problèmes en termes de gouvernance participative et décentralisation. Ce cadre offre plus d’options que la dichotomie simpliste d’indépendance vs. intégrité territoriale du Sénégal.
Par ailleurs, l’une des stratégies de l’ancien président Wade était l’utilisation d’émissaires, que l’on appelait communément «Monsieur Casamance ». Cette stratégie a lamentablement échoué et à plutôt favoriser un réseau de corruption. Il est important pour le GoS de limiter le nombre d’intermédiaires avec le MFDC. La responsabilisation de l’ancien Maire de Ziguinchor, Mr. Robert Sagna en tant que chef négociateur pour le gouvernement permettrait de clarifier et de mieux articuler les positions du gouvernement.

Le risque de « factionalisation » continue du MFDC – La division au sein du MFDC a toujours constitué un défi à relever. Le rapprochement entre Ousmane Niantang Diatta et César Atoute Badiate du Front Sud est un signe encourageant. Mais le différend qui oppose le Front Sud (Diatta et Badiate) au Front Nord (Salif Sadio) constitue une grave menace. Le Front Nord souhaite négocier directement avec le gouvernement du Sénégal tandis que les sudistes veulent premièrement un dialogue au sein du MFDC avant de passer à la négociation avec le gouvernement. Si par le passé, le gouvernement du Sénégal a profité de la division au sein du MFDC, cette fois-ci, un MFDC moins divisé favorable à la paix pourrait être profitable à l’instauration de la paix.

Le risque de discuter avec les radicaux en ignorant les modérés – Les discussions à Rome ont commencé avec Salif Sadio, chef de la plus radicale des factions du MFDC. La Communauté de Sant’Egidio doit avoir probablement agi suivant le vieil adage qui dit que « l’on négocie avec ses ennemis et non pas avec ses amis ». Le résultat a été la frustration croissante du Front Sud de Cesar Batoute et Diatta. Il est temps de ramener à la table des négociations toutes les factions ainsi que les pays voisins que sont la Guinée Bissau et la Gambie. Suivant mon argumentaire ci-dessus, le conflit casamançais est le moteur d’un système de conflit qui part de Banjul en Gambie à Bissau en Guinée Bissau, par conséquent, les pays voisins font autant partie du problème que de la solution.

Ce sont là des défis complexes, les aborder nécessitera leadership et créativité de la part de tous les acteurs impliqués ! Mon espoir c’est de voir le peuple de la Casamance connaître enfin le dénouement de ce long conflit.

Conflict in Casamance, Senegal: The light at the end of a “30 years” long tunnel?

27 Thursday Mar 2014

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On October 14th, 2013 an important meeting was held between representatives of the Government of Senegal and those of the MFDC (irredentist group in Casamance, Senegal). The meeting was facilitated by the Community of Sant’Egidio. This important meeting resulted to a common framework for peace negotiations to end one of the most protracted conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. While promising, the process is threatened by factors and choices that have doomed previous peace processes.

On December 26, 1982, the tension in Casamance, Senegal erupted in a pro-independence demonstration, which was staged in the regional capital, Ziguinchor. The demonstration led to the arrest of several leaders of the Casamance separatist movement, known as the MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance). Subsequent government’s responses triggered an ongoing armed conflict. The conflict in Casamance is one of the Africa’s longest running civil wars. Although not as lethal as some of the intractable conflicts on the continent, this low-intensity conflict (sporadic fighting and attacks using light weapons and land mines) has nonetheless cost the lives of approximately 3,000 – 5,000 people between 1982 and 2010. The current situation in Casamance remains that of “no war, no peace” tainted by sporadic but deadly attacks from both the government and some rebels factions. This situation has stymied development in the region, created a fertile ground for banditry, localized communal conflicts and illegal trafficking of all kind of products ( illegal drugs, timber, small arms and other commodities); furthermore, this economy of war is fueled by the instability in Guinea Bissau, which has become an international platform for narco-trafficking. The local population is trapped in a conflict system that engulfs Senegal, Gambia, and Guinea Bissau.

Despite the regional threats that the Casamance conflict represents, there has not been a sustained and collaborative effort by the international community to support a peace process in Casamance.

Maybe this time around, things are about to change!

Since 1982, there have been multiple attempts to bring about peace in the Casamance. Furthermore, there have been multiple cease fires since 1991. Gambia and Guinea Bissau facilitated some of the cease fires. The first cease fire was signed on May 31, 1991, in Cacheu, Guinea Bissau. However, the Southern Front (one of the factions) of the MFDC never accepted the cease fire agreement. This partial cease-fire held until 1993. Many cease fires followed until the last partial peace accord signed in December 30, 2004 by only one faction of the MFDC. The 2004 accord did not bring peace or a solution to the conflict either.

Given the fractionalization of the MFDC, most of these peace initiatives never received the support of the entire movement, thus defeating the purpose of each of the agreements or initiatives. The MFDC is not the only player at fault, as the Government of Senegal has also failed to support viable paths to peace because of the lack of coordination and follow-up of political and economic commitments.

However, the recent mediation process started in October 2013 and facilitated by the Community of Sant’Egidio carries the promise of a resolution. There seems to be a momentum toward peace, created by several factors, namely: the war fatigue among the population, sustained informal meetings and peace initiatives by various stakeholders both at local and national level, the changing political landscape in Senegal with the election of President Macky Sall, who has promised to bring this conflict to an end; and the return of some international development agencies. These macro trends are also supported by concrete actions such as: The decision by the government of Senegal to cancel the arrest warrant against Salif Sadio one of the leaders of MFDC; also the release by the MFDC of the 09 mine clearers held hostages; and the active role of mediation been played by the Community of Sant’Egidio.

This new momentum for peace in Casamance is not immune from the ills that have plummeted previous peace processes:

Lack of holistic approach by the Government of Senegal (GoS) – The risk for the government of Senegal is two-fold: lack of a comprehensive approach and the use of multiple emissaries. President Macky Sall has made no secret of the fact the peace in Casamance will be part of his legacy. So far, the promise and hopefully the implementation of the development plan of 35 millions euros funded in part by the World Bank and prioritizing agriculture, road and other critical sectors, will help address concrete development issues and grievances that have fueled the conflict for so long. But in the absence of a political framework and way out, the leadership of the MFDC may not be encouraged to genuinely pursuit peace. In looking for political avenue, the GoS should avoid the frame of “National Unity or nothing” Vs. “Independence or nothing”; instead reframe the issues in terms of participative governance and decentralization. This frame opens more options than the simplistic dichotomy of independence vs. territorial integrity of Senegal.

One of the key strategies to address the conflict under President Abdoulaye Wade was the use of emissaries that reported to him directly. These individuals were also called “Monsieur Casamance” by the general public and were supposed to conduct pre-negotiation talks with various factions of the MFDC. They were given important financial resources with no clear scope of work or obligation to justify their use of funds. The use of emissaries has raised a lot of concerns due to high risks of corruption and embezzlement of this strategy. For the moment, former mayor of Ziginchor, Mr. Robert Sagna is leading the discussions on behalf of the Government. He should be supported and empowered to be the only lead negotiator on behalf of the GoS.

The risk of continued fractionalization of the MFDC – The fractionalization of the MFDC has always posed a challenge to previous peace initiatives. The rapprochement between Ousmane Niantang Diatta and César Atoute Badiate in the Southern front is a good sign. But the rift that opposes the Southern front (Diatta and Badiate) and Northern front (Salif Sadio) is a major threat. The latter wants to negotiate directly with the Government of Senegal and the first wants an inter-MFDC dialogue before any negotiation with the government. If in the past, the GoS has used the fractionalization of the MFDC to its advantage, this time a less divided MFDC supportive of peace may be to the advantage of peace.

The risk of talking to radicals and sidelining the moderates – The discussions in Rome started with Salif Sadio, head of the most radical of the MFDC factions. The Community of Sant’Egidio must have probably operated under the old saying that you “negotiate with your enemies not your friends”. The result has been a growing frustration of the moderate Southern Front of Cesar Batoute and Diatta. It is time to bring into the process all the factions and also neighboring countries of Guinea –Bissau and Gambia. As I have argued before, the Casamance conflict is the engine of a conflict system that stretches from Banjul in Gambia to Bissau in Guinea Bissau. So, neighboring countries are part of the problem as well as the solution.

These are complex challenges, addressing them will require creativity and leadership from all stakeholders involved! I hope the people of Casamance will finally see an end to this protracted conflict.

Central Africa Republic – A Multifaceted Crisis

24 Monday Mar 2014

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By Anym Ngu-Muthi, in Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR).
Guest contributor

Over a year after the crisis in the CAR started, the road to recovery is still a long way away. Several mediations and transition governments later, the country is still marred by sectarian violence fueled by a vicious cycle of anger felt by both Muslims and Christians. The crisis in CAR is multidimensional with a huge impact on the political, humanitarian, economic, social and security sectors.

POLITICAL: Problems started for Ex-President Francois Bozize when he failed to adhere to the 2012 Libreville accord. Seleka, a coalition of several rebel groups finally captured Bangui and seized power on the 24th of March 2013. What everyone thought would be the usual violence-free transition from one authority to another in a country with a history of coup d’etats (4 out of the 6 previous leaders came to power through a coup d’état) was not to be. The difference being that the Seleka coalition contained foreign militias (mainly from Chad and Sudan) who were seeking to be rewarded when the mission was accomplished. And so in the months that followed the (new) Presidency of Seleka Leader Michel Djotodia, rampant looting and summary killings became the norm. The lack of control on the different factions that was Seleka combined with the lack of trust of the National Military (believed to be pro-Bozize) meant that the Seleka rebels were left to operate in a lawless environment with utmost impunity.
The continued atrocities committed by Ex-Seleka (the group was disbanded by Djotodia in September 2013) against the mostly Christian community, particularly in the area of Bossangoa (the birth region of Bozize) led to the creation of an auto-defence group known as Anti-Balaka. The evolution of this group from a self defence group to an outright rebel group with military-type offensive strategies adds to the deepening crisis that is the CAR.
In an attempt to curb the worsening violence in the CAR, ECCAS held a Summit in Ndjamena in January 2014 during which the then Head of the Transitional Government, M. Djotodia resigned in the hope that a newly elected transitional Government will be able to turn things around. Instead, what immediately followed was weeks of more instability. And so the current Government of President Catherine Samba-Panza, the first female President of the CAR (3rd in Africa), takes up the mantle in what is hoped will be an effective and ‘peaceful’ transition until elections are held in 2015.
The CAR has had 3 HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (2 TRANSITIONAL) IN LESS THAN A YEAR BETWEEN MARCH 2013 AND JANUARY 2014.

HUMANITARIAN: Events in CAR have generated a major humanitarian crisis with large numbers of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). As of February 2014, the United Nations reported that 2.5 million half of the country’s population were in need of assistance; over 1000,000 IDPs are in 115 makeshift sites/host communities; 413,094 IDPs in 60 sites in Bangui alone (almost half the population of Bangui); 250,000 Central African refugees have fled to neighbouring countries, mainly Chad, Cameroon and the DRC; 31,483 third-country nationals (mainly Muslims) have been evacuated as a result of the sectarian violence; The UN has activated its highest level (L3) emergency response in the CAR and although progress has been made a lot of challenges still remain. Unfortunately the difficult security environment in the country and the targeting of NGOs in certain areas, means that humanitarian work is either being delayed or interrupted.
Ethnic cleansing targeting the minority Muslim population has left them seeking refuge in IDP camps across the city or opting/forced to leave the CAR at the earliest opportunity. The withdrawal of Seleka rebels from certain parts of the country has also left the Muslim population vulnerable to attacks by the mostly Christian Anti-Balaka.

ECONOMICAL: The Central African Republic is a land-locked country, relying heavily on neighbouring countries, particularly Cameroon, for importation of both agricultural and non food items. Not only were Muslims targeted in reprisal killings but their homes and business were looted and completely destroyed. The majority of wholesale businesses are run by the Muslim community and this sector of the economy has all but collapsed with the mass exodus of Muslims from the CAR. During the heart of the crisis the border between Cameroon and the CAR at Beloko was closed resulting in several hundred commercial trucks, carrying vital supplies, stranded at the border. The result? A shortage of basic commodities and a hike in food prices. This vital transportation route between Cameroon and Bangui is now under the control of Anti-Balaka rebels, with movement by commercial trucks on this axis requiring armed escorts by African Union Peace Keepers.
The lack of economic activities and the breakdown of Government institutions means that the government is unable to generate much needed revenue and therefore not able to pay civil servants (3 months arrears owed as of February 2014). While Ms Samba Panza’s Government is trying hard to resolve this backlog of salary payments, the sudden release of cash into the market, (chasing fewer goods) could have a negative impact. Therefore, this process needs to be carefully managed.

SOCIAL: The Education and health care systems have not been spared in the crisis. It is often said that one should try not to fall sick in the CAR – at least not with anything more complicated than malaria or the flu. This is because there are no more than a handful of clinics able to treat but the basic medical conditions and the hospitals are poorly equipped. The standard of healthcare in is wanting at best. The ongoing violence is simply adding weight to an already struggling health system.
During periods of violence, schools shut down for extended periods and the school year has been disrupted. Many children have been out of school since December, although private institutions are slowly resuming as of February 2014.

SECURITY: Best described as volatile and unpredictable – a few days of relative calm are usually followed by eruption of violence. The sound of gunshots, sometimes with heavy weapons, is a daily occurrence. Both rebel groups have contributed to the insecurity currently being experience. Ex-Seleka rebels looted and committed grave atrocities in the months following their successful overthrow of the Bozize Government against the majority Christian population.
In December 2013, an attack against Seleka by anti-Balaka in Bangui saw over 1000 people killed in a few weeks of intense armed clashes between the two groups. This coincided with the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of AU peace keepers (MISCA) and French Forces (Sangaris) in the CAR. An outbreak of violence quickly followed throughout the country and saw the imposition of a country wide curfew from 6pm, later relaxed to 8pm in the February 2014. Sustained killings and looting targeting the Muslim population (and remaining Ex-Seleka elements) has resulted in the use of the word genocide in certain quarters.
The crime rate is on the increase by an unhindered Anti-Balaka as well as unidentified armed criminal gangs (claiming to be anti Balaka), taking advantage of the lawlessness.
February 2014 saw the withdrawal of a majority of the now weakened Ex-Seleka from Bangui (as well as the southern and western part of the country) to the North East and East. In the same vane Anti-Balaka are in control of the South and Western part of the country.
The presence of International peace keeping forces has been both positive and negative. While they have been able to mediate and quell very highly tense situations, they have also been in direct confrontation with the civilian population causing deaths. Insufficient numbers is the main reason for the continued and unabated widespread violence, some of which is as a result of anti French sentiments amongst the population and rebel groups. A timid effort at disarming the militia groups has been made although this has tended to concentrate on Ex-Seleka. According to recent reports, Anti-Balaka are showing a willingness to disarm if Ex-Seleka do the same.
The crime rate will continue to rise as rebel groups and other criminal gangs continue to seek dwindling resources in CAR’s battered economy with few goods available. Reprisal killings between Muslim and Christian communities are likely to go on for the foreseeable future.
The occupation of the North and Eastern part of the CAR (rich in natural resources) by Seleka is believed to be strategic and a partition of the country along sectarian/religious lines is a real concern. The possibility of launching another attack on Bangui cannot be ruled out.

The presence of other rebel groups (RJ – Revolution for Justice; FPR – Front pour le renouveau) in the North West of the country also changes the dynamics as their objectives are not quite clear. The involvement of extremist groups such as Boko Haram and AQIM has been mentioned although no evidence of their activities has been seen to date.
The UN Secretary General has recently called for an expansion of peace-keeping troops in the CAR. The expansion of Sangaris (600 more troops) and extension of its mandate, the proposed deployment of 1000 EU troops and the possible establishment of the DPKO mission proposed by the SG, will likely have a positive impact on the crisis and perhaps bring to an end this turmoil and persistent instability in the heart of Africa.